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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to the Court's
Writ of Certiorari and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a), 1953 as amended.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Respondent Utah County concurs, joins and incorporates herein by this reference

the Issues Presented and Standards of Review contained in the brief of Respondent
Division of Wildlife Resources.
2.

Whether the Court of appeals correctly ruled that Utah County should recover $10

for each day the gate remained within the Bennie Creek Road (hereinafter the Road)
right-of-way after notice was complete, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b).
Specifically, this issue is divided into the following sub-issues:
A.

Whether the Court of appeals correctly granted Utah County's

request to recover $10 for each day the gate remained within the road rightof-way after notice was complete, because the gate placed by Petitioner's
across the Road was an "installation" in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 727-104(4)(b) and the award of damages is not discretionary with the court.
The standard of review for this issue for the court of appeals was
correctness because this issue is a question of law. Allen v. Hall, 107 P.3d
85 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of
the court of appeals for correctness, not the decision of the trial court. State
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v. Levin, 2006 UT 50 % 15, 144 P.3d 1096, 1101.
B.

Whether the court of appeals correctly granted Utah County's

request to recover $10 for each day the gate remained within the Road rightof-way after notice was complete, because the evidence in the record
demonstrates that Utah County met its burden of proof on this issue? The
standard of review for this issue for the court of appeals was clearly
erroneous because this issue is a question of fact. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 935 (Utah 1994), AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168 *{ 7.
On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals for
correctness, not the decision of the trial court. State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50 *f
15, 144 P.3d 1096, 1101.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1), formerly §27-12-89. "A highway is dedicated and
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period often years."
UCA § 72-7-104(l)-(7). See Addendum.
Utah County Code § 17-3-1-1(a), (b), (c), (d) See Addendum.
Utah County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444, 147 P.3d 963

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent Utah County concurs, joins and incorporates herein by this reference
the Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts contained in Respondent Division of
Wildlife Resources brief.
Respondent Utah County adds the following Case and Facts Statement relevant to
Issue 2 above, the award of $10.00 per day damages for everyday the gate remained in the
Road.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Court for a review of the court of appeals decision
affirming the trial court's determination that the Bennie Creek road is a public
thoroughfare and that Utah County's is entitled to judgment, joint and several, against
Randy Butler and Donna Butler (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Butlers") at
the rate of $10 per day from July 29, 1997 to the date of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order [August 16, 2004].
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
After eight days of bench trial, the trial court declared that the Bennie Creek road
is a public road and denied Utah County's request for judgment, joint and several, against
the Butlers at the rate of $10 per day from July 29, 1997 to the date of the Order [August
16, 2004] based on the following finding:
That for some of the time since construction of the metal Butler gate in
1997 it has been locked and the Road has been obstructed and for some of
3

the time it has not. No evidence was presented to clarify how many of the
intervening 2,561 days were days when the Road was obstructed and how
many were not. The Plaintiffs, as the moving party in seeking to obtain the
penalty, had the burden of providing specific evidence of the number of
days the Defendants have been in violation. Merely showing initial service
and testimony that persons were stopped from time to time during the last 6
or 7 years does not meet that burden. Inasmuch as the Court cannot
determine with reasonable precision the number of days during which a
violation of the State statute and County ordinances existed no penalty can
be imposed.
Petitioners appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the district courts
decision declaring the Bennie Creek road to be a public road and granted Utah
County's cross appeal declaring Utah County is entitled to $10.00 per day for each
day the gate remained in the road right-of-way. Petitioners were granted certiorari
by this Court.
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
Prior to July 29, 1997, the Butlers erected a gate across the Road. (R. at
001645:1074-1075). On July 29, 1997, the Butlers were served with Notices dated July
18, 1997 which were signed by David J. Gardner, Chairman of the Utah County Board of
Commissioners, directing them to remove the gate from the Road (hereinafter referred to
as "Road"). (R. at 001645:1147 and Plaintiffs Exhibit Nos. 73 and 74). See Addendum.
After the aforementioned Notices were served on the Butlers, they did not remove
the gate from the Road. (R. at 001645:1147). However, the Butlers did unlock the gate
across the Road for approximately 30 days in October of 2001 and again unlocked the
gate from August 20, 2002 to October 24, 2002. (R. at 001647: Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4).
4

See Addendum. On June 14, 2004 during trial, Randy Butler was asked "After you
received that letter [Notice] did you open the gate?" (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler
responded "No

" (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler was then asked "Is the gate still

closed today and locked?" (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler responded "Yeah." (R. at
001645:1147).
At least 23 witnesses testified at trial that a gate was installed on the Road and
locked, which prevented access unless they obtained permission from the Butlers (R. at
001639:19-20, 31, 58, 135, 150-151, 161-162, 165, 167; 001640:203, 208-210, 218, 221,
224, 227, 237, 240, 247-248, 252, 254-255,261, 266, 279-280, 323, 327, 379, 386-389,
401-402,418,421-422, 424; 001641:446-447,462-464, 467,478,485, 532, 537-538,
566; 001642:691).
The Butlers offered two items to negate the $10 per day penalty. First, counsel for
the Butlers attempted to introduce into evidence Exhibit No. 83, which was disallowed by
the trial court. (R. at 001645:1122-1130).
However, counsel for the Butlers was successful, by stipulation, in introducing into
evidence Exhibit No. 84 which purports to provide notice of a public hearing held on
February 11, 2003. (R. at 001645:1126-1128). The "Notice of Public Hearing" provides
"Notice of Intention of the Board of County Commissioners of Utah County, Utah to
Amend the Official Map Ordinance of Utah County, Utah, Part A, by Deleting, Adding,
and Re-aligning Certain Roads and Notice of a Public Hearing to Consider Said
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Amendment." As it relates to the Road, the "Notice of Public Hearing" provides "Add to
Road (from 3523 East 16962 South to 1223 East 16043 South) Sec. 20, 21, 22, 26 & 27
T10SR3E." (R. at 001648:84)
Randy Butler testified that he attended the February 11, 2003 Utah County
Commission Meeting and that the Road was discussed. Mr. Butler further testified that
the Road was not designated as a county road at that meeting. (R. at 001645:1127-1128).
During closing argument, counsel for the Butlers commented that "the County to date has
not designated that road as a county road." (R. at 001646:1215).
Contrasted with the testimony of Randy Butler is the testimony of Clyde Naylor.
Mr. Naylor testified that he is the County Engineer, County Surveyor, and Public Works
Director. Mr. Naylor further testified that Utah County has entered into a number of
agreements with the Forest Service for maintenance of the Road (R. at 001639:86-98;
Exhibit Nos. 50, 52-58). These agreements with the Forest Service go back to as early as
January 8, 1974. (R. at 001639:86). Mr. Naylor also testified of a number of general
highway maps of Utah County depicting the Road as a class D road. (R. at 001639:98110, 114; Exhibit Nos. 60, 62-66). These maps go back to as early as 1955. (R. at
001639:101).
The second item introduced by the Butlers was Exhibit No. 80-C, which is a
picture of a sign. Utah County stipulated that it put the sign on the gate. (R. at
001645:1139-1140; 001648:80-C). The sign reads "Keep Gate Closed Private Property to
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Forest Service Boundary No Trespassing Off Road." (R. at 001648:80-C)
During closing argument, the trial court made some very interesting and telling
statements about the $10 a day penalty. The trial court commented that "Your client was
served on the 29th of July, 1997. The road has remained obstructed from then until now.
Just totaling it up it's something like 2,300 days. We're talking $23,400 or something. I
mean that's - and that's not counting the present year." (R. at 001646:1214). The trial
court also stated that "the only testimony I have is that from '96 on the gate was locked. I
know from having supervised this case for a little while that there was a period of time by
consent when the gate wasn't locked and then it was locked again. I don't know. But
none of that testimony was presented at trial, so let's stick to the evidence that I heard at
trial." (R. at 001646:1219).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Respondent Utah County concurs, joins and incorporates herein by this reference

the Summary of Arguments contained in Respondent Division of Wildlife Resources'
brief.
2.

Petitioners have failed to marshal the evidence which support the court of appeals

decision that Respondents' witnesses were members of the public, that no trespassing
signs posted private property along the Road but not the Road itself and that gates were
for stock control. Petitioners fail to marshall any of the testimony of more than 40 of
Respondents' witnesses, several state, Forest Service and other maps (dating from as
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early as 1955), photographs and other exhibits in evidence showing the Road as a public
road. Respondents' evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the court of
appeals decision, establishes that Respondents' witnesses were lawfully using a public
thoroughfare.
Despite the fact that Respondents presented evidence of uninterrupted public use
from the 1920fs through 1997 by 48 witnesses and 75 exhibits, including maps and 48
photos, Petitioners claim that there was no evidence to marshal in support of the finding
of continuous use. Petitioners do nothing more than re-argue Petitioners' witnesses'
testimony which was discredited in the trial court's Memorandum Decision.
In the face of evidence of continuous uninterrupted public use from the 1920's
through 1997, Petitioners also complain that a specific ten year time period before 1958
or after the early 60fs was not identified, yet fail to marshall any evidence which would
support a finding of continuous use. To attack this finding the Petitioners are required
and have failed to marshal the evidence to show that there is no evidence before or after
the identified time periods which would support a finding of continuous public use for
any ten year period. The failure to identify a time period is, however harmless error and
not reversible as two ten year periods within a 55 year period of continuous public use
were identified.
Petitioners failed to provide a list of evidence supporting the factual findings
supporting the court of appeals decision and also failed to point out any fatal flaws in the

8

evidence. In this case Petitioners' failure to marshal results in the assumption that the
record supports the decision of the court of appeals. Petitioners do nothing more than reargue the facts which were not credible as outlined in the trial court's Memorandum
Decision. Because Petitioners failed to marshall the evidence, Petitioners' appeal should
be dismissed.
3.

Petitioners Butler and Evans did not allege Respondents' witnesses were

trespassers in their Answer to the Complaint or Amended Complaint as required by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioners, by failing to assert the trespass arguments in
the Answer to the Amended Complaint waived this defense. Further, even if not waived,
Petitioners carried the burden of establishing the claimed trespass arguments as an
affirmative defense and failed to do so. Requiring a party to establish his own case does
not shift the burden of proof.
4.

Defendants' arguments in I.C. of Petitioners' Brief contain conclusory statements

without any supporting case law or analysis and are so inadequately briefed that the court
should not consider these arguments. The cases cited in support of the contention that
Plaintiffs had the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that those traveling
the Road were not trespassers did not address the argument,
Petitioners' trespass argument is also not relevant. Landowner acquiescence and
consent are not elements required to find dedication of a public thoroughfare. To engage
in the examination of whether landowners restricted use of the road invites the Court to
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inquire into the consent or acquiescence of the landowner which has previously been
rejected as an element of dedication by use. What is consistent with the ruling that land
owner consent is not relevant is that trespass does qualify as use within the meaning of
the dedication by use statute. Only continuous use by the public for ten years results in
dedication by use, not an occasional trespass.
Petitioners do not allege any no trespassing signs prior to the late 1950?s or early
1960fs, leaving 30 years of public use of the Road before landowners posted the property
adjacent to the road. The public did not trespass when traveling the Road which was
already established by use. If property owners wrongfully placed gates across the Road
and posted no trespassing signs in the late 50's or early 60's, it was long after dedication
by public use.
5.

Utah statutes establish the laws of the State of Utah respecting the subjects to

which the statutes relate and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.
UCA 68-3-2. Accordingly, section 72-5-104 and it's predecessor are to be liberally
construed to effect the objects of the statute. Rather than being modified by common law,
the dedication by use statute modifies common law trespass. Following Petitioners'
logic, anyone who physically invaded the land of another are not members of the public
for the purpose of dedication by use, rendering the public dedication statute meaningless.
Such a construction would prohibit 72-5-104 from being construed with the view to effect
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the objects of the statute. Physical invasion of land is an essential element of the public
dedication statute. It is not an occasional trespass, but continued public use over the
required 10 year period of time which ripens into dedication and abandonment of a public
road. Trespass principles have no application to this case.
6.

The court of appeals correctly determined that the gate was an "installation" in

violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104, irrespective of whether it was locked or not.
The term "installation" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b), although not defined,
includes gates, locked or not, installed within right-of-ways. In this case, Petitioners
Butler erected a gate across the Road and were served with Notices to remove the gate. It
is undisputed that the Petitioners did not remove the gate. Furthermore, there is no
evidence that the Petitioners ever sought or obtained permission from the Utah County
Commission to erect a gate across the Road, locked or not. As a result, the gate was
improperly erected across the Road and Respondent Utah County is entitled to the $10 a
day penally.
7.

The court of appeals correctly held that after Respondent met its burden under

Utah Code § 72-7-104, the trial court did not have discretion to deny the statutory
damages. The decision of the court of appeals was a reversal of the trial court decision
and a remand for a specific calculation of statutory damages under Utah Code Ann. § 727-104. In challenging the court of appeals decision, Petitioners argue that the word "may"
as used in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 is used to give the trial court discretion to deny the
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statutory damages.
None of the four uses of the word "may" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104, give the
trial court discretion to deny the statutory damages. Rather, "may" allows the highway
authority to elect its remedy. The words preceding the word "may" are the key words that
inform the reader that it is the highway authority which may choose its remedy. There is
no mention of the Court. It is simply the highway authority's choice.
Even the title of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 describes that statute as the "rights of
highway authorities." It is the right of the highway authority to elect its remedy to either
remove the installation or to give notice and collect $10 per day. The title confirms this
as well as the subsections read in context.
8.

The Petitioners have not briefed nor argued before this court nor before the court

of appeals that the evidence at trial was insufficient to warrant the statutory damages
specified in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. The failure of Petitioners to respond to
Respondent's sufficiency of the evidence arguments is a concession by Petitioners that
there was sufficient evidence produced at trial to warrant the statutory damages of Utah
Code Ann. §72-7-104.
9.

There is little doubt that the underlying burden of proof on whether the Road has

been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public was by clear and convincing
evidence. However, there is also little doubt that the standard of proof as to Utah
County's request to recover the $10 per day penalty was preponderance of the evidence.
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10.

The court of appeals correctly determined that the evidence at trial was sufficient

to warrant the statutory damages specified in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. The evidence
produced at trial was that the Petitioners erected a gate across the Road and were served
with Notices to remove the gate on July 29, 1997. The Petitioners, after being served
with the Notices, did not remove the gate from the Road. Furthermore, Petitioner Randy
Butler testified that after being served the Notice that he did not open the gate and that the
gate was still closed and locked as of the day he testified. Also, at least 23 witnesses
testified at trial that a gate was installed on the Road and locked, which prevented access
unless they obtained permission from Petitioners. The trial court even commented during
closing argument that "Your client was served on the 29th of July, 1997. The road has
remained obstructed from then until now. Just totaling it up it's something like 2,300
days. We're talking $23,400 or something. I mean that's - and that's not counting the
present year." (R. at 001646:1214). Later during closing argument, the trial court stated
that "the only testimony I have is that from '96 on the gate was locked. I know from
having supervised this case for a little while that there was a period of time by consent
when the gate wasn't locked and then it was locked again. I don't know. But none of
that testimony was presented at trial, so let's stick to the evidence that I heard at trial."
(R. at 001646:1219). From the evidence produced at trial, it is clear that Respondent met
its burden of proof that the gate on the Road was locked from July 29, 1997 through trial.
The trial court even so commented.
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There was additional evidence in the record, Exhibit 4, a letter from Randy Butler
to former Utah County Commissioner Gary L. Herbert, dated December 9, 2002. In that
letter, Mr. Butler clearly sets forth the periods of time when the gate was unlocked, which
consisted of approximately 30 days in October 2001 and from August 20, 2002 to
October 24, 2002 (66 days), for a total of 96 days. There is no additional evidence that
the gate across the Road was ever unlocked.
Finally, the two items introduced by the Petitioners consisting of a "Notice of
Public Hearing" and a sign placed on the gate were deficient to negate the $10 per day
penalty.
ARGUMENT
I.

PETITIONERS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN THIS
CASE WHICH SUPPORTS THE COURT OF APPEALS AND TRIAL COURT
FINDINGS OF CONTINUOUS USE BY THE PUBLIC.
Petitioners' argue that Respondents' witnesses were trespassers and that

Respondents' evidence does not support a finding of continuous use. The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that Respondents witnesses were members of the
public and that no trespassing signs posted private property along the Road but not the
Road itself. (R. 1465, 66) In support of their arguments, Petitioners referenced only
conflicting evidence and fail to mention that Respondents' remaining 40 plus witnesses
did not see no trespassing signs and that those cited by Petitioners who did interpreted the
signs to post property along the Road.
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Respondents evidence of uninterrupted public use from the 1920's through 1996 by
48 witnesses, at all seasons, for various reasons and 75 exhibits including 48 photos, state
and other maps from as early as 1955, rebuts Petitioners claim that there was no evidence
to marshal in support of the finding of continuous use. None of these witnesses,
including Petitioner Butler's predecessors in interest, testified that irrigation, bogs or
springs prevented public use of the Road. No facts were found that support a finding of
restricted access on the Road. It was ruled that no trespassing signs posted property along
the Road and that gates were for stock control.
Petitioners do nothing more than re-argue Petitioners' witnesses' testimony which
was discredited in the trial court's Memorandum Decision. SeeR. 1463-1470. The
evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the court of appeals and trial court
decisions, establish that Respondents' witnesses were members of the public continuously
using a public thoroughfare. The court of appeals correctly ruled that the trial court's
findings supported the conclusions of continuous public use of the Road for 70 years.
Supporting the court of appeals affirming continuous use, the trial court found that
ten witnesses personally used the Road for recreation in the 1940fs and 50fs, none
encountered locked gates, sought permission or were prevented from traveling the Road
and drove vehicles well into Forest Service property. R. 1470. A 1949 aerial photograph
showed the Road extending from U.S. Highway 89 into the vicinity of the National Forest
and all of Mr. Butler's predecessors in interest from 1927-1963 (Madge Truman, Virginia
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Johnson, Shirlene Ottesen) testified the Road was traveled often by the public and no
attempts were made to restrict or deny public access to the Road. R 1471.
In the face of overwhelming evidence of continuous uninterrupted public use from
the 1920's through 1997, Petitioners complain that a specific ten year time period before
1958 or after the early 60fs was not identified, yet fail to marshall any evidence which
would support a finding of continuous use. To attack this finding the Petitioners are
required, and have failed, to marshal the evidence to show that there is no evidence before
or after the identified time period which would support a finding of continuous public use
for ten years. As any ten year period between 1920 and 1997 will support the court of
appeals's decision, Petitioners were required to marshall and show that there was no ten
year period of continuous public use. In any event, any failure to name a specific 10 year
period is harmless error and not reversible as the court found at least two ten year periods
before and after the late 1950?s and early 1960fs within a 55 year span of continuous
^

—«**—

>

public use. Defendants also cannot demonstrate that an error, if any was committed, was
harmful or of such a magnitude that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the Defendants. State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63 ^f 22.
Petitioners' failure to marshal any evidence in support of the continuous use
findings is highlighted by the fact that Petitioners' Statement of the Case and Statement of
Facts are almost identical, commencing not with the facts relevant to this case, but with
Respondents filing this action and detailing procedural matters concluding with the grant
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of certiorari. Petitioners' Brief, pp.3-6.
To challenge factual findings one "must marshal the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence the trial court's findings are not
supported by clear and convincing evidence." Young v. Young, 1999 UT38 15, 979 P.2d
238 (quoting/ft Re State ofBartell 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)(citations omitted.)).
To properly marshal the evidence [one] must first list all of the evidence supporting the
challenged finding. See, e.g., Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68, f7; 987 P.2d 588. [A
party] must then show that the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the
findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the
decision. See Id....

To properly marshal the evidence one must 'show that the findings

are not supported by clear and convincing evidence... [and]... in comprehensive and
fastidious order, [present] every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which
supports the very findings the appellant resists. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818
P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991) emphasis added. AWINC Corp. v Sirnonsen, 2005 UT
App 168^|9, 10.
Petitioners failed to provide a list of evidence supporting the factual findings relied
on by the court of appeals and the trial court. See Id., <f 10. Petitioners not only failed to
provide a comprehensive list of evidence but also failed to point out any fatal flaws in the
evidence. Id. In this case Petitioners' failure to marshal results in the assumption that the
record supports the findings of the court of appeals and trial court. Id.
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When a party fails to marshal the evidence supporting a challenged fact finding,
[the court] reject[s] the challenge as "nothing more then an attempt to re-argue the case
before [the appellate] court." PromaxDev. Corp. v. Madsen, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah
Court App. 1997), cert denied 943 P.2d 247 (Utah 1997), Campbell v. Box Elder County,
962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Because Petitioners failed to marshall the
evidence, Petitioners' appeal should be dismissed.
II.

IF RELEVANT AND NOT WAIVED, PROOF THAT RESPONDENTS'
WITNESSES WERE TRESPASSERS IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ON
WHICH PETITIONERS HAVE THE BURDEN OF PROOF.
Petitioners did not allege Respondents' witnesses were trespassers in their Answer

to the Complaint or Amended Complaint as required by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. R. 277, 130. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require a party to state in
short and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted. URCP 8(b). A party is further
required to set forth affirmatively any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative
defense. URCP 8(c). Every defense in law or fact to a claim for relief in any pleading
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required. URCP 12(b). A
party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by answer or
reply. URCP 12(h). Petitioners failure to assert the trespass arguments in the Answer to
the Amended Complaint results in a waiver of this defense.
Petitioners had the burden of establishing the claimed trespass arguments as an
affirmative defense and failed to do so. As Respondents presented primae facie evidence

of public and continuous use, that postings and signs restricted access to property along
the Road, that the Road was used in all seasons and at all times and gates were used for
stock control, it was the Petitioners that had the burden to show that use was not by the
public or continuous. Petitioners instead seek to shift their burden of proof to
Respondents. Requiring a party to establish his own case does not shift the burden of
proof. Affirmative defenses require the party asserting them to meet the burden of proof
as to every necessary element. Messickv. PHD Trucking Services, Inc., 615 P.2d 1276,
1277 (Utah 1980).
III.

PETITIONERS' ARGUMENT THAT RESPONDENTS HAD THE BURDEN OF
PROOF TO SHOW THEIR WITNESSES WERE NOT TRESPASSERS IS
MERITLESS
A. Petitioners' Arguments Are Inadequately Briefed.
Arguments that contain no meaningful analysis are inadequately briefed and

should not be considered. See Bernat v. Allphin 2005 UT1, ^ 38, 106 P.3rd 707.
Petitioners' arguments in I.C. of Petitioner's brief contain conclusory statements without
any supporting case law or analysis and are so inadequately briefed that the court should
not consider these arguments. The cases cited in support of the contention that
Respondents had the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that those
traveling the Road were not trespassers do not support their argument. The contention
that the court of appeals and trial court impermissibly relieved Respondents of their
burden to prove dedication by clear and convincing evidence by not applying trespass
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principles is not supported by case law and is lacking any legal argument or analysis.
Petitioners' arguments in section IC of their brief are mere assertions without legal
support or analysis and should be rejected .
B. Whether Members of the Public Are Trespassers Is Not Relevant.
Petitioners' trespass argument is also not relevant as it has been previously decided
that consent of the land owner is not a relevant issue to dedication of a public
thoroughfare. Heber City Corp. V. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 311(Utah 1997). What is
consistent with the ruling that land owner consent is not relevant is that trespass does
qualify as use within the meaning of the dedication by use statute. Since owner intent is
irrelevant, whether the Road was posted or whether any of those using the Road were
trespassers is not relevant. The only issue addressed in the cases cited by Petitioners is
whether the use was permissive which Petitioners have not asserted. Furthermore, an
occasional trespass is insufficient to create a public Road. A court can rightly assume that
a landowner that does not prevent public travel through his property for ten years has
dedicated and abandoned the way to public use. A land owner that is diligent in
preventing travel across his property, will prevent a public thoroughfare from being
created by trespassers. Travel by an occasional trespasser is not sufficient to create a
public thoroughfare.
In fact the public did not trespass when traveling the Road which was already
established by use prior to posting the property adjacent to the Road. If property owners
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wrongfully placed gates across the Road and posted no trespassing signs in the late 50fs or
early 60fs, it was long after dedication by public use. However, as found by the court of
appeals the trial court properly found that posted signs prevented travel off the Road and
gates were placed to control stock and not restrict Road access.
C. Petitioners' Trespass Argument is Fatally Flawed.
Even if Petitioners' arguments regarding trespass were relevant or properly raised,
Petitioners do not allege any no trespassing signs prior to the latel950^s or early 1960fs.
leaving 30 years of public use of the Road before landowners posted the property adjacent
to the Road. Taking the converse of Petitioners' arguments, if seven individuals were
trespassers because they saw trespass signs and their use could not be public use because
they were trespassers, the use of the Road from the 1920's to the late 1950fs or early
1960's would then_be public use as the property was not posted nojrespassing. Public
access on the Road was also not restricted as signs posted property along the Road and
gates were for stock control only.
IV.

UCA 72-5-104 IS NOT SUBJECT TO TRESPASS PRINCIPLES.
At statehood the common law of England so far as it was not repugnant to or in

conflict with the constitution or laws of the State of Utah was adopted. UCA 68-3-1. The
rule of the common law that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly
construed has no application to Utah statutes. Utah statutes and all proceedings under
them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to
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promote justice. UCA 68-3-2. UCA 72-5-104 formerly UCA 27-12-89 has remained
substantially unchanged since first enacted by the territorial legislature in 1886. Lindsay
Landon Livestock Co. v. Churnos 75 Utah 384, 285 P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1929). R 1473.
Section 72-5-104 and it's predecessors are to be liberally construed to effect the objects of
the statute. Rather than being modified by the common law, the dedication by use statute
modifies common law trespass.
Use of the Road as a public thoroughfare for a period often years is the question
before the court, not whether the public were trespassers. Following Petitioners' logic
anyone who physically invaded the land of another are not members of the public for the
purpose of dedication by use, rendering the public dedication statute meaningless. Such
an interpretation prohibits U.C.A. 72-5-104 from being liberally construed with the view
to effect the objects of the statute. UCA 68-3-2. Under Petitioners' argument no one
could be a member of the public under the public dedication statute as the courts have
previously determined that permissive use of a thoroughfare cannot ripen into a public
way. To engage in the examination of whether the use of the Road was restricted as
suggested by Petitioners engages the court in an examination of whether the landowner
consented or acquiesced in the use which has already been rejected. To the contrary,
physical invasion of a public thoroughfare is an essential element of the public dedication
statute. Utah statutes have modified the common law. Trespass principles have no
application to this case.

22

V.

INCORPORATION OF DIVISION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES BRIEF.
To the extent not incorporated above, Respondent Utah County adopts, joins in

concurs with and incorporates herein by this reference all arguments and sections of the
Respondent Division of Wildlife Resources brief filed in this matter.
VI.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE GATE
WAS AN "INSTALLATION" IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-7104(4)(b) IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER IT WAS LOCKED OR NOT.
The court of appeals correctly determined that the gate was an "installation" in

violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b) irrespective of whether it was locked or
not. Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b) provides that a "highway authority may recover
$10 for each day the installation remained within the right-of-way after notice was
complete." (emphasis added). The term "installation" is not defined in the Protection of
Highways Act, Chapter 7 of Title 72 of the Utah Code.
However, Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(1) provides some insight as to the meaning
of the term "installation" as follows:
If any person, firm, or corporation installs, places, constructs, alters, repairs,
or maintains any approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer,
ditch, culvert, outdoor advertising sign, or any other structure or object of
any kind or character within the right-of-way of any highway without
complying with this title, the highway authority having jurisdiction over the
right-of-way may:
(a) remove the installation from the right-of-way or require the person, firm,
or corporation to remove the installation; or
(b) give written notice to the person, firm, or corporation to remove the
installation from the right-of-way.
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The above subsection is all encompassing and certainly contemplates gates, locked or not,
installed within right-of-ways. Likewise, the term "installation" in Utah Code Ann. § 727-104(4)(b) would also contemplate gates, locked or not, installed within right-of-ways.
In this case, Petitioner Randy Butler admits that prior to July 29, 1997, the Butlers
erected a gate across the Road. (R. at 001645:1074-1075). Mr. Butler also admits that he
and his wife, Donna Butler were served on July 29, 1997 with Notices dated July 18,
1997 and signed by David J. Gardner, Chairman of the Utah County Board of
Commissioners, directing them to remove the gate from the Road. (R. at 001645:1147
and Plaintiffs Exhibit Nos. 73 and 74.) See Addendum.
At trial on June 14, 2004, Randy Butler was asked "After you received that letter
[Notice] did you open the gate?55 (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler responded "No

55

(R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler was then asked "Is the gate still closed today and
locked?55 (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler responded "Yeah.55 (R. at 001645:1147).
During closing argument, the trial court commented that "Your client was served on the
29th of July, 1997. The road has remained obstructed from then until now.55 (R. at
001646:1214). It is undisputed that after the aforementioned Notices were served on the
Butlers, they did not remove the gate from the Road.
A "gate is not allowed on a county road unless authorized by the county executive
in accordance with the provisions of this section [Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-106].55 Utah
Code Ann § 72-7-106(5)(a). In other words, a person seeking to install a gate in a right-
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of-way must comply with Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-106 by seeking and obtaining the
permission of the county executive. There is no evidence that the Butlers ever sought or
obtained permission from the Utah County Commission to erect a gate across the Road,
locked or not. It is interesting to note that nowhere in the Protection of Highways Act,
Chapter 7 of Title 72 of the Utah Code, does it provide for the locking of gates on county
roads. Even if we assume that permission was obtained to erect a gate across the Road,
that permission would certainly have been terminated by the serving of the
aforementioned Notices on the Butlers, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-106(5)(b).
The court of appeals correctly determined that the gate was an "installation" in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b) irrespective of whether it was locked or
not, thereby reversing the decision of the trial court. Therefore, the court of appeals
decision should be upheld and Utah County should be granted judgment in the amount of
$10 for each day the gate remained within the right-of-way after notice was complete
from July 29, 1997 to August 16, 2004 [the date of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order] for a total of 2,574 days and $25,740.00.
VII.

THE DISCRETION AFFORDED BY UTAH CODE § 72-7-104 RESTS WITH
THE HIGHWAY AUTHORITY, NOT THE COURTS.
The court of appeals correctly held that after Utah County met its burden under

Utah Code § 72-7-104, the trial court did not have discretion to deny the statutory
damages. The decision of the court of appeals was a reversal of the trial court decision
and a remand for a specific calculation of statutory damages under Utah Code Ann. § 7225

7-104. In challenging the court of appeals decision, Petitioners argue that the word "may"
as used in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 is used to give the trial court discretion to deny the
statutory damages.1 There are four instances that the word "may" is used in Utah Code
Ann. § 72-7-104, none of which give the trial court discretion to deny the statutory
damages. Rather, "may" allows the highway authority to elect its remedy. Petitioners
will address all four uses of the word "may" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104.
A.

Use of the Word "May" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(1).

The first instance of the use of the word "may" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104
occurs in subsection (1), which reads as follows:
(1) If any person, firm, or corporation installs, places, constructs, alters,
repairs, or maintains any approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit,
sewer, ditch, culvert, outdoor advertising sign, or any other structure or
object of any kind or character within the right-of-way of any highway
without complying with this title, the highway authority having
jurisdiction over the right-of-way may:
(a) remove the installation from the right-of-way or require
the person, firm, or corporation to remove the installation; or
(b) give written notice to the person, firm, or corporation to

]

The issue of discretion was raised by the court of appeals during oral argument.
The trial court did not deny the statutory damages by exercising its perceived discretion.
Rather, the trial court denied the statutory damages based on insufficient evidence.
Petitioners have never argued to uphold the decision of the trial court or reverse the court
of appeals based on insufficient evidence. The failure of Petitioners to argue
insufficiency of the evidence is akin to an admission that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the statutory damages. Furthermore, Respondent will demonstrate that the
evidence was sufficient to prove compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. See Parts
IX and X herein.
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remove the installation from the right-of-way.
(emphasis added). Subsection (1) is essentially an election of remedies provision which
gives the highway authority the discretion to either remove the installation, or to give
notice to the responsible party to remove the installation. The words preceding the word
"may" which are emphasized above are the key words that inform the reader that it is the
highway authority which may choose its remedy. There is no mention of the court. It is
simply the highway authority's choice.
This is important because both options in Subsection (1) bring a disadvantage. By
illustration, if the highway authority chooses to simply remove the installation, then the
highway authority and its agents may be subject to a trespass claim. See Bloomquist v.
Summit County, 483 P.2d 430 (Utah 1971) (where this Court held that summary judgment
was inappropriate because of issues of fact, but discussed the possibility that government
officials may not be protected by immunity from suit when they tear down a gate on a
private road.). On the other hand, if the highway authority chooses to give proper notice
to the responsible party and seek relief in court, then the case may drag on for years, like
in the present case.
B.

Use of the Word "May" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4).

The second instance of the use of the word "may" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104
occurs in subsection (4), which reads as follows:
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A highway authority may recover:
(a) the costs and expenses incurred in removing the
installation, serving notice, and the costs of a lawsuit if any;
and
(b) $10 for each day the installation remained within the rightof-way after notice was complete.
(emphasis added). Just like Subsection (1), it is the words preceding the word "may" and
emphasized above which are the key words that inform the reader of Subsection (4) that it
is the highway authority which has the discretion to determine its recovery. Again, there
is no mention of the court. It is simply the highway authority's choice. The use of the
word "may" also recognizes that if the highway authority chooses the self help provision,
then the $10 per day would not be available, or that the cost of removing the gate is not
available if the owner complied with the notice to remove the gate.
C.

Use of the Word "May" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(5)(a).

The third instance of the use of the word "may" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104
occurs in subsection (5)(a), which reads as follows:
If the person, firm, or corporation disputes or denies the existence,
placement, construction, or maintenance of the installation, or refuses to
remove or permit its removal, the highway authority may bring an action
to abate the installation as a public nuisance.
(emphasis added). Just like Subsections (1) and (4) above, it is the words preceding the
word "may" and emphasized above which are the key words that inform the reader that
Subsection (5)(a) that it is the highway authority which has the discretion to bring an
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action to abate the installation as a public nuisance. There is no mention of the court. It
is simply the highway authority's choice.
D.

Use of the Word "May" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(5)(b).

The fourth and final instance of the use of the word "may" in Utah Code Ann. §
72-7-104 occurs in subsection (5)(b), which reads as follows:
If the highway authority is granted a judgment, the highway authority may
recover the costs of having the public nuisance abated as provided in
Subsection (4).
(emphasis added).

This is the same song and fourth verse. It is the words preceding the

word "may" and emphasized above which are the key words that inform the reader that
Subsection (5)(b) that it is the highway authority which has the discretion to recover the
costs of having the public nuisance abated. There is no mention of the court. It is simply
the highway authority's choice.
E.

The Title of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 Confirms That the Discretion
Afforded Rests with the Highway Authority, Not the Courts.

If there is ever a question as to the intent of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104, one may
look no further than its title, which states "Installations constructed in violation of rulesRights of highway authorities to remove or require removal." (emphasis added). The
title of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 describes that statutes as the "rights of highway
authorities." That it is the right of the highway authority to elect its remedy to either
remove the installation or to give notice and collect $10 per day is confirmed by the title
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as well as the above subsections read in context.
Therefore, this Court should uphold the decision of the court of appeals, which
held that after Utah County met its burden under Utah Code § 72-7-104, the trial court did
not have discretion to deny the statutory damages. Utah County should be granted
judgment in the amount of $10 for each day the gate remained within the right-of-way
after notice was complete from July 29, 1997 to August 16, 2004 [the date of the Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order] for a total of 2,574 days and $25,740.00.
VIII. TO THIS POINT, PETITIONERS HAVE NOT BRIEFED NOR ARGUED THAT
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT THE
STATUTORY DAMAGES SPECIFIED IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-7-104.
To this point, the Petitioners have not briefed nor argued before this court nor
before the court of appeals that the evidence at trial was insufficient to warrant the
statutory damages specified in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104.
"If an appellee fails to respond to an issue in its brief, the court may treat the
failure to respond as a confession that the appellant's position is correct... or determine
that the issue has merit." 5 Am Jur. 2d. Appellate Review, §555; See also Nance v. Miami
Sand & Gravel, LLC, 825 N.E.2d 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ("appellee's failure to
respond to an issue raised in an appellant's brief is, as to that issue, akin to failing to file a
brief") The failure to respond to the merits of a controversy can be considered a
confession of reversible error. See Bulova Watch Co. v. Super CityDept. Stores of Ariz.,
Inc., 4 Ariz.App. 553, 422 P.2d 184 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967).
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In Utah County's briefs, both before the court of appeals and now this Court, Utah
County has argued that the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to warrant the
statutory damages of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. Petitioners have not responded and
now have conceded that there was sufficient evidence produced at trial to warrant the
statutory damages of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. Therefore, this court should uphold
the decision of the court of appeals, which reversed the decision of the trial court, thereby
ruling that there was sufficient evidence produced at trial to warrant the statutory
damages of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104.
IX.

THE UNDERLYING BURDEN OF PROOF ON WHETHER UTAH COUNTY
IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER $10 FOR EACH DAY THE GATE REMAINED
WITHIN THE RIGHT-OF-WAY AFTER NOTICE WAS COMPLETE WAS
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE.
The underlying burden of proof on whether the Road has been dedicated and

abandoned to the use of the public was by clear and convincing evidence. See Draper
City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995). However, "there is
similarly little doubt that the standard of proof generally applied in civil proceedings is
the preponderance of the evidence standard." See Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931, 9356 (Utah Ct. App 1998) {citing Johns v. Shulsen, 111 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986) ("It is
universally recognized that the standard of proof in civil actions is by a preponderance of
the evidence."); Lipman v. Industrial Comm% 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1979) (noting
preponderance is "usual standard of proof... used in most civil actions"); Morris v.
Farmers Home Mut Ins. Co., 28 Utah 2d 206, 500 P.2d 505, 507 (1972) (stating
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preponderance is "universally recognized standard of proof required to establish facts in a
civil ease")). This usual standard of proof of a preponderance of evidence applies to Utah
County's request to recover $10 for each day the gate remained within the right-of-way
after notice was complete, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b).
X.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT THE
STATUTORY DAMAGES SPECIFIED IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-7-104.
The court of appeals correctly determined that the evidence at trial was sufficient

to warrant the statutory damages specified in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. The evidence
produced at trial was that prior to July 295 1997, the Butlers erected a gate across the
Road. (R. At 001645:1074-1075). On July 29, 1997 the Butlers were served with
Notices dated July 18, 1997 and signed by David J. Gardner, Chairman of the Utah
County Board of Commissioners, directing them to remove the gate from the Road. (R.
At 001645:1147 and Plaintiffs Exhibit Nos. 73 and 74.)
After the aforementioned Notices were served on the Butlers, they did not remove
the gate from the Road. (R. at 001645:1147). On June 14, 2004 during trial, Randy
Butler was asked "After you received that letter [Notice] did you open the gate?" (R. at
001645:1147). Randy Butler responded "No...." (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler was
then asked "Is the gate still closed today and locked?'5 (R. at 001645:1147). Randy
responded "Yeah." (R. at 001645:1147).
At least 23 witnesses testified that Butler's gate was installed on the Road and
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prevented access unless they obtained permission from the Butlers (R. at 001639:19-20,
31, 58, 135, 150-151, 161-162, 165, 167; 001640:203, 208-210, 218, 221, 224, 227, 237,
240, 247-248, 252, 254-255, 261, 266, 279-280, 323, 327, 379, 386-389, 401-402, 418,
421-422, 424; 001641:446-447, 462-464, 467, 478, 485, 532, 537-538, 566; 001642:691).
During closing argument, the trial court commented that "Your client was served
on the 29th of July, 1997. The road has remained obstructed from then until now. Just
totaling it up it's something like 2,300 days. We're talking $23,400 or something. I mean
that's - and that's not counting the present year." (R. at 001646:1214). Later during
closing argument, the trial court stated that "the only testimony I have is that from '96 on
the gate was locked. I know from having supervised this case for a little while that there
was a period of time by consent when the gate wasn't locked and then it was locked
again. I don't know. But none of that testimony was presented at trial, so let's stick to
the evidence that I heard at trial." (R. at 001646:1219).
Furthermore, there was additional evidence in the record, such as a letter from
Randy Butler to former Utah County Commissioner Gary L. Herbert, dated December 9,
2002, in which Mr. Butler set forth with reasonable precision the amount of days that he
left the gate unlocked. (R. at 001647: Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4). In that letter, Mr. Butler
states that "in October of 2001, we agreed to allow access for the hunts. That fall Utah
County put up a sign on the gate that stated it was private property to the U.S. Forest
Service Land. We left the gate unlocked for approximately 30 days
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We locked the

gate again until August 20, 2002 without incident

Consequently, I locked the gate on

October 24, 2002, and as of December 1, 2002, there has not been any problem." (R. at
001647: Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4).
The only evidence to the contrary offered by Respondents was the "Notice of
Public Hearing" and a sign placed on the gate across the Road by Utah County as part of
a temporary settlement proposal in October of 2001 and discussed in the previous
paragraph. However, those two items were deficient to negate the $10 per day penalty
proscribed in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104.
The first item presented by the Respondents was Exhibit No. 83, which was
disallowed by the trial court. (R. at 001645:1122-1130). However, Respondents, by
stipulation, introduced Exhibit No. 84 into evidence which purports to provide notice of a
public hearing held on February 11, 2003. (R. at 001645:1126-1128). The "Notice of
Public Hearing" provides "Notice of Intention of the Board of County Commissioners of
Utah County, Utah to Amend the Official Map Ordinance of Utah County, Utah, Part A,
by Deleting, Adding, and Re-aligning Certain Roads and Notice of a Public Hearing to
Consider Said Amendment." As it relates to the Road, the "Notice of Public Hearing"
provides "Add to Bennie Creek Road (from 3523 East 16962 South to 1223 East 16043
South) Sec. 20, 21, 22, 26 & 27 T10S R3E" as a class "B" county road. (R. at 001648:84)
Randy Butler testified that he attended that February 11, 2003 Utah County
Commission Meeting and that the Road was discussed. Mr. Butler further testified that
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the Road was not designated as a county road at that meeting. (R. at 001645:1127-1128).
During closing argument, counsel for the Butlers commented that "the County to date has
not designated that road as a county road." (R. at 001646:1215).
Contrasted with the testimony of Randy Butler is the testimony of Clyde Naylor.
Mr. Naylor testified that he is the County Engineer, County Surveyor, and Public Works
Director. Mr. Naylor further testified that Utah County has entered into a number of
agreements with the Forest Service for maintenance of the Road (R. at 001639:86-98;
Exhibit Nos. 50, 52-58). These agreements with the Forest Service go back to as early as
January 8, 1974. (R. at 001639:86). Mr. Naylor also testified of a number of general
highway maps of Utah County depicting the Road as a class D road. (R. at 001639:98110, 114; Exhibit Nos. 60, 62-66). These maps go back to as early as 1955. (R. at
001639:101).
As a result of the testimony of Clyde Naylor, it is evident that Utah County has
considered the Road as a class D county road since at least as early as 1955. In each of
the aforementioned maps and agreements, the Road is so designated as a class D county
road. Clearly, the weight of evidence demonstrates that Utah County has so designated
the Road as a class D county road.
The second item introduced by the Respondents was Exhibit No. 80-C, which was
a picture of a sign. Utah County stipulated that it put the sign on the closed gate. (R. at
001645:1139-1140; 001648:80-C). The sign reads "Keep Gate Closed Private Property to
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Forest Service Boundary No Trespassing Off Road." (R. at 001648:80-C). Utah County
merely installed this sign to be a good neighbor, to instruct the public to stay on the Road,
and as part of a temporary settlement to allow hunters to use the Road in October of 2001
following the TRO hearing.
Neither the "Notice of Public Hearing" nor the sign are evidence that the Road is a
private road. Likewise, neither the "Notice of Public Hearing" nor the sign are evidence
that Utah County allowed the Respondents to install a gate across the Road. Therefore,
the trial court properly ignored these two items offered by the Petitioners.
Respondents can point to no other evidence to the contrary because there is none.
The trial court even so commented when it said "the only testimony I have is that from
'96 on the gate was locked. I know from having supervised this case for a little while that
there was a period of time by consent when the gate wasn't locked and then it was locked
again. I don't know. But none of that testimony was presented at trial, so let's stick to
the evidence that I heard at trial." R. at 001646:1219). Petitioners' evidence does not
rebut Utah County's evidence entitling Utah County to the statutory damages.
Therefore, this court should uphold the decision of the court of appeals that the
evidence at trial was sufficient to warrant the statutory damages specified in Utah Code
Ann. § 72-7-104, thereby reversing the decision of the trial court. As a result, Utah
County should be granted judgment in the amount of $10 for each day the gate remained
within the right-of-way after notice was complete from July 29, 1997 to August 16, 2004
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[the date of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order] for a total of 2,574 days
and $25,740.00 or in the alternative subtract 94 days for the time the gate was unlocked in
October 2001, and from August 20, 2002 to October 24, 2002 and adjust the judgment
accordingly.
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing, and on the brief of Respondent State of Utah, Division of
Wildlife Resources, Respondent Utah County respectfully requests:
1. That the Court uphold the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial
court's determination that the Road is a public thoroughfare having been continuously
used by the public for a period often years and dismiss Petitioners' appeal,
2. That the Court affirm the court of appeals decision ordering that on remand
Utah County is entitled to judgement against Petitioners Butler for statutory damages of
$10.00 for each day that the gate remained in the Road right of way after service of the
Notice to remove the same, or in the alternative, for $10.00 for each day the gate
remained locked across the Bennie Creek Road after service of the Notice to remove the
same.
3. For Plaintiffs costs incurred in this matter including costs on appeal.
4. For such further relief as is just and equitable in the premises.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ ^ day of June, 2007.

M. CORT GRIFFIN
Deputy Utah County Attorney

ROBERT J^MOORE
Deputy Utah County Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, on this ^ £ d a y of June, 2007, to the following:
SCOTT L. WIGGINS
Arnold & Wiggins, P.C.
57 West 200 South #105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
MARTIN B. BUSHMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Utah Attorney General's Office
1594 West North Temple, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
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ADDENDUM

72-7-104.

Installations constructed in violation of rules - Rights of highway
authorities to remove or require removal.

(1)
If any person, firm, or corporation installs, places, constructs, alters, repairs,
or maintains any approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer, ditch, culvert,
outdoor advertising sign, or any other structure or object of any kind or character within
the right-of-way of any highway without complying with this title, the highway authority
having jurisdiction over the right-of-way may:
(a)
remove the installation from the right-of-way or require the person,
firm, or corporation to remove the installation; or
(b)
give written notice to the person, firm, or corporation to remove the
installation from the right-of-way.
(2)
Notice under Subsection (l)(b) may be served by:
(a)
personal service; or
(b) (i) mailing the notice to the person, firm, or corporation by certified
mail; and
(ii) posting a copy on the installation for ten days.
(3)
If the installation is not removed within ten days after the notice is
complete, the highway authority may remove the installation at the expense of the person,
firm, or corporation.
(4)
A highway authority may recover:
(a)
The costs and expense incurred in removing the installation, serving
notice, and the costs of a lawsuit if any; and
(b)
$10 for each day the installation remained within the right-of-way
after notice was complete.
(5)
(a)
If the person, firm, or corporation disputes or denies the existence,
placement, construction, or maintenance of the installation, or refuses to
remove or permit its removal, the highway authority may bring an action to
abate the installation as a public nuisance.
(b)
If the highway authority is granted a judgment, the highway authority
may recover the costs of having the public nuisance abated as provided in
Subsection (4).
(6)
The department, its agents, or employees, if acting in good faith, incur no
liability for causing removal of an installation within a right-of-way of a highway as
provided in this section.
(7)
The actions of the department under this section are not subject to the
provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative Procedures Act.

17-3-1-1. Enforcement
If any person places, constructs, or maintains any approach road, driveway, pole,
pipeline, conduit, sewer, ditch, culvert, billboard, advertising sign, or any other structure
or object of any kind of character within the right-of-way of any county road, without first
obtaining permission from the Board of County Commissioners, the Commissioners may:
(a)
remove such installation from the right-of-way or require such person to
remove the same; or
(b) give written notice to such person to remove such installation from the
right-of-way; such notice may be served either by personal service or by
mailing the notice to the person by registered mail and posting a copy
thereof on such installation for a period often (10) days; and if such
installation is not removed within ten (10) days after the notice is complete,
the Commission may remove the same at the expense of the person and
recover costs and expenses, and also the sum often dollars ($10.00) for
each day the same remained within the right-of-way after notice was
complete, in an action for that purpose; or,
(c)
if such person disputes or denies the existence of such installation, or
refuses to remove or permit its removal, the Commission may bring an
action to abate the same as a nuisance; and if judgment is recovered, in
addition to having the same abated, the costs of action and the sum often
dollars ($10.00) for every day such nuisance remained within the right-ofway after notice was given for its removal in the manner provided in
Subsection (b) of this Section.
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** NOTICE **
TO:

Randy Butler
Donna Butler
2721 East 17050 South
Birdseye, UT 84629

DATE:

July 18,1997

Pursuant to Utah County Ordinance 17-3-1-1 and Utah Code Annotated 27-12-135, a person
may not place, construct or maintain any pole or any other structure or object of any kind or
character within the right-of-way of any County road or highway without the permission of the
Board of Utah County Commissioners. You have, without the pemiission of the Utah County Board
of Commissioners, placed a gate across the Bennie Creek Road, which is a County road under Utah
County Ordinance 17-1-1.
You are hereby given notice to remove from the Bennie Creek Road any and all poles,
structures or objects of any kind or character placed, constructed or maintained by you within the
right-of-way of the Bennie Creek Road, including, but not limited to, any gates placed thereon by
you.
If, within ten(10) days of service of this notice on you, you fail to remove from the Bennie
Creek Road any and all gates, poles, structures or objects of emy kind or character placed,
constructed or maintained by you within the Bennie Creek Road right-of-way, the Utah County
Commission may remove the same at your expense and recover costs and expenses from you
including the sum of $10.00 for each day the same remains within the Bennie Creek Road right-ofway after this notice was served upon you or bring an action to abate the same as a nuisance. If
judgement is recovered by the Commission, the Commission may also recover in the addition to
having the same abated the costs of action and the sum of $10.00 for every day such nuisance
remained in the Bennie Creek Road right-of-way after service of this notice upon you.
Govern yourself accordingly.

David J. Gardner, Chairman,
Utah County Board of Commissioners
MCG:tae
U J CO*T\r3U^K*BTLMWT
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** NOTICE **
TO:

Randy Butler
Donna Butler
2721 East 17050 South
Birdseye, UT 84629

DATE:

July 18,1997

Pursuant to Utah County Ordinance 17-3-1-1 and Utah Code Annotated 27-12-135, a person
may not place, construct or maintain any pole or any other structure or object of any kind or
character within the right-of-way of any County road or highway without the permission of the
Board of Utah County Commissioners. You have, without the permission of the Utah County Board
of Commissioners, placed a gate across the Bennie Creek Road, which is a County road under Utah
County Ordinance 17-1-1.
You are hereby given notice to remove from the Bennie Creek Road any and all poles,
structures or objects of any kind or character placed, constructed or maintained by you within the
right-of-way of the Bennie Creek Road, including, but not limited to, any gates placed thereon by
you.
If, within ten(10) days of service of this notice on you, you fail to remove from the Bennie
Creek Road any and all gates, poles, structures or objects of any kind or character placed,
constructed or maintained by you within the Bennie Creek Road right-of-way, the Utah County
Commission may remove the same at your expense and recover costs and expenses from you
including the sum of $10.00 for each day the same remains within the Bennie Creek Road right-ofway after this notice was served upon you or bring an action to abate the same as a nuisance. If
judgement is recovered by the Commission, the Commission may also recover in the addition to
having the same abated the costs of action and the sum of $10.00 for every day such nuisance
remained in the Bennie Creek Roadright-of-wayafter service of this notice upon you.
Govern yourself accordingly.

David J. Gardner, Chairman,
Utah County Board of Commissioners
MCG:tae
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